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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Does plaintiff's failure to raise the "dual 
capacity" doctrine argument in the Court below preclude him from 
raising that argument in this appeal? 
2. Is plaintiff's claim against Mr. Iversen barred 
because they were co-employees, regardless of the "dual capacity" 
doctrine? 
3. Has plaintiff stated a claim against Mr. Iverson 
arising out of his Motor Carrier Leasing Agreement? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action arising out of a 
construction accident which occurred September 5, 1986. 
Plaintiff sued both the general contractor, James Cape & Sons 
Company, and defendant Iversen. 
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Iversen was 
dismissed upon motion for summary judgment May 29, 1990. The 
dismissal order included certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the dismissal as a final judgment and is here on appeal. The 
case as against James Cape & Sons Company is ongoing before the 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. James Cape & Sons, Inc. (Cape) was the general 
contractor for the paving of a portion of 1-15 located near 
Beaver, Utah. The Ralph Smith Company (RSC) was a subcontractor 
who provided truck service. 
2. Plaintiff Daniel Smith was employed by RSC as the 
foreman on the job. (D. Smith Depo., p. 13.) 
3. It was plaintiff's job to hire and fire drivers 
such as defendant Monroe Iversen and to supervise their 
performance. RSCs trucks picked up wet batch cement at the 
cement batch plant and transported it to the paving site. At the 
site, the trucks would back up towards the paving machine and 
dump their loads as directed. (Iversen Depo., pp. 29-37.) 
4. Defendant Iversen, like all other RSC drivers on 
the job, worked under an equipment lease agreement. Under this 
agreement, the drivers provided their own trucks and were paid at 
an hourly rate. (Iversen Depo., p. 2 6.) 
5. Most or all of the trucks used by RSC on the job 
did not have back up warning devices. (Iversen Depo., p. 86.) 
6. Plaintiff was apparently aware that the trucks did 
not have such devices, having worked with and about them for many 
months prior to the accident. Plaintiff was not aware of any 
requirement that they have them. Plaintiff did not require any 
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of his drivers to obtain back up warning devices on their trucks. 
(Dan Smith Depo., p. 60.) 
7. Additionally, the on-site manager for Cape also 
had no knowledge of any requirement that the trucks have back-up 
devices and took no steps to require such devices. (Ken Snyder 
Depo., p. 28.) 
8. Defendant Iversen takes issue with the unsupported 
statement in plaintiff's brief that his truck was defective 
because it, like the other trucks, did not have a back up warning 
device. Plaintiff's brief alleges that UDOT standards for the 
job required back up devices. There is no indication that these 
standards were ever provided to or brought to Mr. Iversenfs 
attention. 
9. Defendant Iversen and the other drivers had 
virtually no discretion in the performance of their jobs. They 
were instructed either by Cape personnel or by plaintiff (their 
foreman) when to show up on the job and begin driving, when to 
quit for the day, when they could take breaks or have lunch, what 
route to follow in driving between the cement batch plant 
and the paver, where to dump their loads, when to dump their 
loads, and when to clean out their equipment. (Iversen Depo., 
pp. 81-83.) 
3 
10. The drivers were all directed by plaintiff to 
maintain their CB radio on a certain channel so that plaintiff 
could give directions to them at any time. (Iversen Depo., 
p. 64.) 
11. Defendant Iversen's truck and trailer were 
inspected by plaintiff, Cape, and representatives of UDOT at 
various times throughout the job. (Iversen Depo., pp. 69, 87-
90.) No one ever told him he should get a back up warning for it. 
ACCIDENT 
12. The day of the accident was the last day of the 
job. The paving work had almost reached the location of the 
cement batch plant. It was only necessary to drive 1,000 to 
1,500 yards from the batch plant to the paver location. (Iversen 
Depo., p. 91.) The accident occurred when plaintiff was standing 
in front of the paver photographing other trucks on the job. He 
was standing in the very location where trucks had to back up to 
dump their loads of cement. Iversen, following directions, 
backed his truck to the paver and was unable to see plaintiff. 
Plaintiff was hit by the truck as it backed up. (Iversen Depo., 
p. 51-61.) 
DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
13. Plaintiff filed a Complaint suing Cape, alleging 
that Cape's flag people had improperly directed or failed to 
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direct Iversen as he backed up. He also sued Iversen, claiming 
that Iversen was an independent contractor and that Iversen 
breached his duty of due care by: 
a. failing to keep a proper lookout; 
b. operating the dump truck without the presence 
of a dump master to guide him, in violation of the 
instructions he had received; and 
c. operating his dump truck without back up 
warning devices. 
(Plaintiff's Complaint, para. 27, R. 1-6.) The Complaint makes 
no allegations against Iversen as an equipment lessor. 
14. Plaintiff has now conceded that Iversen was a 
"statutory employee" of RSC and, therefore, a co-employee of 
plaintiff at the time of the accident. (Plaintiff's Brief, 
p. 5.) 
15. Plaintiff now alleges that Iversen is liable to 
him under a dual capacity doctrine as a lessor of the truck as 
opposed to as a driver of the truck. (Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 4-
7.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's Complaint makes no allegations against 
defendant Iversen other than negligence in the operation of his 
truck. As pled, the Complaint fails to raise the "dual capacity" 
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argument on which plaintiff now bases his entire appeal. Having 
failed to plead it before the lower court, plaintiff is barred 
from raising this new argument at this time. 
In addition, Utah has not recognized the dual capacity 
doctrine plaintiff now argues. That doctrine has specifically 
been rejected in similar cases by this court and has generally 
been rejected by courts across the country. 
Finally, the facts of this case show no basis of 
liability whatsoever for defendant Iversen as a lessor. The 
equipment he provided was inspected by plaintiff himself on 
behalf of RSC. It was also inspected by UDOT. It was leased to 
RSC following that inspection and was apparently fully 
satisfactory to plaintiff and RSC. The absence of a back up 
alarm on the equipment was open and obvious and consistent with 
most, if not all, of the other trucks RSC had on the job. There 
is no liability of a lessor who leases a truck that fully 
conforms with the lessee's requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAVING FAILED TO PLEAD ANY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT 
IVERSEN OTHER THAN FOR NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF THE TRUCK, CANNOT 
NOW RAISE A NEW CLAIM. 
Plaintiff's claim, as pled, sounds only in negligence 
as against Mr. Iversen for his operation of the truck. There is 
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no allegation of some separate duty arising from the leasing 
agreement between Iversen and RSC. The Complaint fails to 
suggest any duty Iversen had which was breached under the 
Agreement. 
A simple review of the facts shows that the equipment 
provided by Iversen under the agreement met RSC standards. It 
was specifically examined and accepted by RSC through its agent, 
plaintiff. 
In responding to Iversen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
in this case, plaintiff has cast about for a theory of liability 
against Mr. Iversen. The only properly pled theory, however, is 
a negligence theory alleging that he is an independent 
contractor. Plaintiff has abandoned that theory. In responding 
to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff suggested that Mr. 
Iversen was an employee of RSC who had been loaned to Cape. 
(R. 187-194) This position has also apparently been abandoned. 
The only mention of a claim against Mr. Iversen as a 
lessor in the lower court was made in one paragraph at the end of 
plaintiff's responsive memorandum to the motion for summary 
judgment. There is no allegation of a "dual capacity doctrine." 
(R. 192) Plaintiff never moved to amend his Complaint to make 
such a claim. No case law in support of the point was cited. 
Additionally, no clarification was given, whatsoever, as to what 
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was the basis of any duty Mr. Iversen would have had under the 
lease. 
It is inappropriate for an appellate court to consider 
a legal theory not clearly raised or pled at the trial court 
level. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987). In the 
James case, the court commented: 
In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings 
nor put in issue at the trial may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
[Citation.] A matter is sufficiently raised 
if it has been submitted to the trial court 
and the trial court has had the opportunity 
to make findings of fact or law. [Citation.] 
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or 
readily discernable from the pleadings, 
affidavits, and exhibits will not be 
considered." [Citation.] In particular, 
even if the pleadings are generously 
interpreted, if they are not supported by any 
factual showing or by the submission of legal 
authority, they are not presented for 
decision. 
746 P.2d at 801. 
In the instant case, plaintiff, having failed in a lower 
court to raise the "dual capacity doctrine" or to plead a cause 
of action for breach of a duty under the lease, may not now raise 
this issue. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S NEW CLAIM AGAINST IVERSEN IS BARRED 
BY THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTES. 
As noted above, plaintiff has conceded that Mr, Iversen 
was a co-employee with plaintiff under the applicable Utah 
Worker's Compensation statutes.1 As such, plaintiff may not sue 
Mr. Iversen for his injury, arising from on the job activity.2 
Plaintiff now, for the first time, proposes the "dual capacity 
doctrine." Plaintiff suggests that because Iversen1s contract 
with RSC required him to provide a truck, that puts him in a 
"dual capacity" relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiff has 
directed the Court's attention to no reported case of a similar 
circumstance in which the "dual capacity doctrine" was applied. 
In those cases where the "dual capacity doctrine" has been 
raised before this court, it has consistently been rejected. 
Stewart v. CMI Corporation, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987) and Binaham 
v. Lacroon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985). 
^tah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-42 and 35-1-60. 
2The case of Gallegos v. Strinqham, 442 P.2d 31 (Utah 1968) is 
directly on point. It involved an essentially identical 
employment/truck lease agreement. The truck involved was being 
driven on a very similar street paving job. Plaintiff was an 
employee of a contractor on the job and sued, making allegations of 
negligence against an owner/operator of one of the trucks. This 
court had no difficulty in applying the worker's compensation bar 
under the statutory employee rules. 
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The Lagoon case involved a Lagoon esmployee who was 
injured when standing in the vicinity of one of the Lagoon rides 
known as the Colossus. The employee sued alleging that Lagoon 
occupied a dual capacity, both as a contractor, and as a park 
operator. In rejecting this position, this court stated: 
It is sufficient to observe that even those 
jurisdictions that recognize and apply the 
doctrine would probably not do so here. The 
annotator at page 1155 of the annotation 
referred to above [23 A.L.R. 4 1163] observes 
that attempt by employees to hold their 
employers liable for injuries resulting from 
the employer's maintenance of unsafe 
premises, on the reasoning that the employer 
occupies a separate capacity and owes 
separate duties to employees as owner of the 
premises, have generally been rejected for 
the reason that the employer's duty to 
maintain a safe workplace is inseparable from 
the employer's general duties as an employer 
towards his employees. We agree with that 
reasoning. 
707 P.2d at 680-81 (emphasis added). 
The instant case involves a virtually identical 
situation. Mr. Iversen's duty as a co-employee to operate and 
maintain his truck in a proper manner was inseparable from any 
duty he may have had as a provider of the vehicle. His providing 
the vehicle was part of his employment. 
Similarly, in the Stewart case, supra, the court 
rejected the dual capacity doctrine. In that case, it was argued 
that the employer, a contractor, had a dual capacity because it 
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also manufactured the equipment that caused plaintiff's injury. 
The court rejected this distinction and the application of the 
dual capacity doctrine to the case. If the dual capacity 
doctrine does not apply to an equipment manufacturer, it 
certainly can't apply to an equipment lessor such as Mr. Iversen. 
As noted by this Court in previous cases and the 
commentators, the "dual capacity" doctrine is generally very 
restrictively applied, if at all. 23 A.L.R. 4th 1151. It is 
clearly not applicable in this case. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS ALLEGED NO THEORY OF LIABILITY AGAINST 
DEFENDANT IVERSEN AS A LESSOR. 
As noted above, plaintiff's pleadings makje no 
allegation of any kind against Mr. Iversen arising from his 
contract as a lessor. The facts are undisputed that plaintiff 
himself negotiated the lease contract with Mr. Iversen. The 
plaintiff inspected Mr. Iversen's truck and trailer and accepted 
it. There is no allegation that Mr. Iversen's truck failed in 
any way. The only allegation is that at the time it was leased, 
it did not have a piece of equipment known as a backup alarm. 
The fact that such an alarm was not in place was obvious to 
everyone concerned. 
The truck was not defective. It performed exactly as 
represented. If RSC was obligated to Cape to have backup alarms 
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on its trucks for this particular job, it was RSC's obligation to 
see that they were installed. Plaintiff has specifically 
admitted that, as foreman for RSC, he had no understanding that 
backup alarms were required to be in place and took no steps to 
have any installed. 
The fact that plaintiff, or RSC, or Cape, failed to 
fulfill some obligation under their contracts with the UDOT on 
the road project does not make Mr. Iversen responsible as a 
lessor. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has conceded that Mr. Iversen was a statutory 
co-employee with plaintiff. As such, plaintiff is restricted to 
his recovery under Workmens Compensation insurance and may not 
sue Mr. Iversen. 
Plaintiff has cast about in the lower court, and now 
presents new theories here attempting to find some basis upon 
which to keep Mr. Iversen in this case. Plaintiff's latest 
theory, the "dual capacity doctrine," is not sufficient. This 
doctrine was not raised in the lower court and cannot be raised 
for the first time here. Furthermore, even in those 
jurisdictions which have conditionally accepted the doctrine, it 
would not apply in a case such as this where Mr. Iversen's 
performance as an employee and as a truck lessor were so totally 
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intertwined. Additionally, there is no indication of any breach 
of a duty by Mr. Iversen as a lessor. The truck he provided was 
inspected and accepted by plaintiff himself. If a backup alarm 
was necessary, it was plaintiff's obligation to see that it was 
installed. 
Judge Sawaya's Order dismissing Mr. Iversen from the 
case should be affirmed. * 
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